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THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: COMPULSIVES
IN LABOR RELATIONS*
JosEPH ROSENFARB**
It is no secret that organized labor is eager to cast off wartime
governmental controls in the field of labor relations. At least the
observer is justified in arriving at this conclusion from the loud prot-
estations of labor leaders in convention addresses and in post-prandial
dissertations. Such expressions of labor's attitude are usually accom-
panied by attacks on the particular government official responsible for
the latest frustration of labor's demands.1 To some extent such asser-
tions by labor are consciously or not make-weights to maintain the
pressure calculated to cause the erring "poobah" to mend his ways.
But there is abundant reason to believe that great clusters of labor
leaders genuinely look forward to the end of the war as the time for
liberation from wartime restraints on the collective bargaining process.
The chief wartime restrictions from which deliverance is sought are
the strike taboos2 and wage ceilings.8
* This article constitutes a portion of a forthcoming book on the nature and
functions of the modern state. It will bear the title of this article: "The Ad-
ministrative State."
**LL.B., Law School, University of Pittsburgh; Director, Labor Relations
Division of the Research Institute of America, New York; formerly on the legal
staff of the National Labor Relations Board in Washington; author of the NA-
TIOxAL LABOR POLIcY A ] How IT Woaxs, Harper and Bros., 1940; HIGHWAY To
ToKyo, Little, Brown and Co., 1943; and of numerous articles in technical and
general publications on labor, law, military strategy, politics and economics.
There is, of course, nothing new in this. Contrary to popular belief every
annual convention of the AF of L and CIO has resounded with complaints and
threats against one or another member of the National Labor Relations Board.
IWartime strike prohibitions include criminal sanctions and plant seizure under
the War Labor Disputes Act, 57 STAT. 163, 50 U. S. C. A. §1501 (Supp. 1943) ;
sanctions against strikers and union officials by Director of Economic Stabilization
under authority of Execative Order No. 9370, Paragraphs B and C, 8 FED. REG.
11463 (1943), 54 STAT. 1191, 50 U. S. C. A. §583 (Supp. 1940) ; sanctions against
strikers and unions by the National War Labor Board by denial or conditional
grant of union security, Monsanto Chemical Co., WLB Case No. 292, Aug. 18,
1942, and Semet-Solvay Co., WLB Case No. 347, Mar. 19, 1943; denial of re-
instatement by WLB to employees who strike in violation of "no-strike" contract
clause, Borg-Warner Corp., WLB Case No. 111-5665-D, May 16, 1944; denial of
reinstatement by National Labor Relations Board to employees who strike to
force employer to violate Economic Stabilization Act, In re American News Co.,
Inc., 55 N. L. R. B. 1302 (1944). Labor's no-strike pledge is not vitiated by
strike vote under War Labor Disputes Act, Anson v. Gilkey, WLB Case No.
111-2356-D, rel. Nov. 12, 1944.8Executive Order No. 9017 (Jan. 12, 1942) ; 56 STAT. 765 (1942), 50 U. S. C.
A. §§961, 962 (Supp. 1943) as amended by 57 STAT. 63 (1943), 50 U. S. C. A.
§§964, 964(a) (Supp. 1943) and Pub. L. No. 383, 78th Cong. 2d Sess. (June 20,
1944); Executive Order No. 9328 (Apr. 8, 1943) ; Pub. L. No. 89, 78 Cong. 1st
Sess. (June 25, 1943).
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It is quite obvious that this desire of organized labor to return to
the status quo ante in collective bargaining parallels an even more
articulated nostalgia of business for the golden age of laissez-faire "free
enterprise."
One can sympathize with this prevailing mood as an expression of
war fatigue, of a deep yearning for surcease from the stresses and un-
certainties of wartime living which breed neuroses. But nostalgia is a
mood suitable at best only to the arts, particularly the drama. Nostalgia
,does not become statesmanship. It is most important to determine
whether the drive of both business and labor to turn the clock back in
regard to governmental intervention in our economy is in accord with
the compulsive forces of our society. If it is, then it deserves support
and will fructify the postwar era. If it isn't, then even its realization
should be considered at best as transitory as the last fling in the twilight
of life before darkness stills the faint whisperings of the blood.
Of course the war has been the occasion for the wide ramification of
governmental controls of our economy. Similarly, these controls-over
prices, production, wage stabilization, manpower and labor relations-
have been conditioned by the needs and purposes of war. But it is an
error fatal to correct analysis to assume that their existence is entirely
coterminous with the war and is an atypical social phenomenon irrele-
vant to our peacetime economy. The trend toward the interpenetration
of the economic and political processes is one of the chief characteristics
of at least the last half century, and has manifested itself virtually in
every economy in the world. It has varied in its pace of development
and form of manifestation, but it has become the common denominator
of modern socio-economic evolution. It would not do to explain away
this trend by the claim that it is due to the advocacy and belief of man.
One may reply that what man thinks is as much a datum of our en-
vironment demanding adjustment to it as any other factor. More
significant, it is the policies and parties which have advocated govern-
ment intervention in our economic affairs which have triumphed every-
where against the greatest opposition, whether through orderly pro-
cedures or by revolution. There must be some vital need in our economy
which this phenomenon fulfills for it to survive in the process of his-
torical selection.
Obviously such universality must be in response to a condition
rather than a theory. We need not genuflect to the doctrine of inevita-
bility in social relations to realize that we are dealing here with a
fundamental condition of present-day society.
If government intervention in our economy were not indigenous to
our culture, its tempo of development would not have been increased by
the war-the classic accelerator of historical processes. Feudalism was
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progressively weakened and nascent capitalism emerged triumphant in
the wars of the period. This ought not to occasion surprise. War,
involving the use of mass armies, particularly modem total war, is
largely a function of the economy. Since success in war is the ultimate
acid test of survival, it tends to bring to the surface the elements in our
socio-political relationships best suited for the utilization of our tech-
nology. The mechanism for this is the tendency for the disappearance
of opposition to wartime measures which in peacetime would be po-
litically inconceivable short of some catastrophic event bordering on
political and economic collapse. It is therefore a valid generalization
to make that war is the laboratory of the future peace, that wartime
controls of our economy reveal a prescient glimpse of what the com-
parable peacetime techniques will ultimately be after an understandable
time lag. World War Part I was a crucible for much of the labor
legislation of the last quarter of a century.
The irreversible trend towards monopolization of industry on a
national scale and its cartellization in the international field has been
conditioned by the fissiparous division of labor in our technology, .by
mass production, and by the dirive for power in the economic realm.
These factors pyramiding up to monopoly render necessary the positive
participation of government in the economic process if our industrial
machine is to be run at anywhere full capacity.
Is the same trend manifest in the actualities of labor relations?
II
Any analysis of the labor situation must begin with the size and
growth of labor organization as a point of departure. When Roosevelt
took the oath of office in 1933, the membership of organized labor was
down to about three million and the curve was still pointing down-
ward.& 4 Organized labor as a factor in our society, both economic and
political, was approaching the vanishing point. Towards the end of
1944 organized labor has approximated the unprecedented total of
fourteen million members. Of these, the AF of L has reported at the
1944 convention a paid-up membership of nearly seven million. The
CIO at its 1944 convention claimed six million members. A conserva-
tive estimate of John L. Lewis' United Mine Workers including Dis-
trict 50, as well as the Railroad Brotherhoods and the various inde-
pendents such as Smith's M.E.S.A., would furnish the total of over
one million workers. If we compare these figures with the total work-
ing population of the country engaged in industry and commerce, about
forty-three millions,5 organized labor blankets about thirty-three per-
'LEO WOLMAX, EBB AND FLOW ix TRADE UIONmsm (National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1936) 16.
'The Labor Force, Dept. of Commerce (Dec. 18, 1941).
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cent of these. Though these figures mount up to a very impressive
picture of labor strength, even when viewed in and by themselves, they
do not convey sufficiently the full dynamic contours. The details of
the silhouette are even more imposing. Railroads, bus lines, telephone,
telegraph, radio, steel, autos, aircraft, mining, shipbuilding, and many
other industries are all operating under collective bargaining agreements
with unions. Stated differently, the operation of our basic industries
and of our communication system is necessarily conditioned and greatly
influenced by the economic and ultimately political policies of organized
labor. Hence the nuclear character of organized labor's position in our
economy. This is not indicated as a sinister phenomenon which bodes
ill for our society. Not at all. But whether we view it with alarm or
with hope it remains a fact.
Nor is it realistic to look toward the postwar period for a substantial
and permanent diminution in labor strength and influence. Reconver-
sion will bring about the elimination of many women and older workers
from industry with consequent loss in union membership. The shift
in production from war to peace will tend to produce a similar result.
It is true, of course, that unemployment, which may accompany the
reconversion period, will be a factor as it has in the past, to reduce
union membership.6 In a period of widespread unemployment the
returning veterans are now looked upon as a fertile source for anti-
union mobilization by certain unreconstructed elements in industrial
circles who have not yet reconciled themselves to the reality that col-
lective bargaining is here to stay. Similarly, the turgescence of union
membership during the war is not due altogether to intensive honest-to-
goodness organizing campaigns. Much of labor's mushrooming has
been due to the blanketing character of union security contracts that
labor has been able to obtain under the pressure of wartime production.7
It would be surprising indeed if multitudes of union members did not
look upon their union only as an agency for the collection of dues. And
it must be pointed out that union officials have for the most part done
very little in the direction of educating their members as to the reason
for existence and benefits of unions. It is the path of least resistance
to invest union funds against the day when reduced union membership
might not be adequate to pay union salaries than to spend money to
increase solidarity in the membership by making it union conscious.
When the winds of conflict will sweep the industrial front, lost edu-
cational opportunities might show up in lost strikes, for in a prolonged
struggle it is only the convinced union member that can be relied upon
'Strikes in 1943, B. L. S. BULLEBTiN No. 782, p. 2.
As of Jan., 1944, dosed shop contracts covered about thirty percent and union
shop agreements almost twenty percent of all workers under union agreements, or
together, a total of about six and a half milliori workers.
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not to break the ranks and leave the picket line for the assembly line.
The internecine conflict in labor chiefly between the CIO and AF of L
with or without the accouplemeit of John L. Lewis will tend to reduce
the influence of labor because of the inversion of its energies. It will also
not add to the public euphoria in regard to labor by sharpening and
spreading jurisdictional disputes.
Despite these factors, whose potency is not being minimized, union
strength viewed over a period of several years rather than for the im-
mediate postwar interval, will undergo accretion. For the following
reasons: The great corporate reserves and tax rebates which will be
available to business after the war will enable many industries to cushion
the impact of idle plants, as far that is as the financial position of
business is concerned. But unemployment will not accomplish the
elimination of organized labor. It will accelerate however the process
of that which the irreconcilables fear most-government intervention.
If there is one assertion worthy of generalization into a maxim of
modern politics it is that no government irrespective of party affiliation
or ideological fidelity will be suffered by the people to stand by for
long and permit unemployment to "run its course." Any government
confronted with grave unemployment will be expected not only to pro-
vide relief but also employment, or lose not only its right but its power
to govern. The doctrine of states' rights does not fill the bread basket,
and it is only on full stomachs that democratic liberties have a chance
to survive in modern society.
The returning veteran out of a job will be told that his salvation
lies in taking a job away from a member of the union. But with wide-
spread unemployment and shut-down plants this will hardly sound
convincing. The returning veteran might, of course, fall victim of at
least para-fascist propaganda, but it is more likely that, returning to
the civilian environment, the veteran will be grafted to the same social
roots which are responsible for the growth of unions. It has been
noted that veterans who have returned to the factories are frequently
found among the leaders or at least participants of strikes.
The veterans like the rest of industrial America will find that it is
organized labor which can be most relied upon to exert even political
pressure to have the government provide jobs or create the conditions
for jobs. Curiously, in the conviction that organized labor is an effec-
tive pressure group which can deliver the goods, the masses of workers
have been substantially assisted by the daily press. It is true of course
that wage ceilings apply to organized labor as well as to the unorganized
worker. But only a union can process a case effectively before the
National War Labor Board or the other wartime agencies. Whether
in steel, coal, or the railroads the average reader of the press cannot
1945]
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help but observe that, though the Little Steel formula is still not even
bent, as Chairman Davis assures him,s it has not prevented the or-
ganized workers involved from getting a bigger "take home" as the
result of union representation before government agencies and pressure
which bordered on or passed over into strikes. The effect is not lost.
This is not a criticism of the action of the boards and officials in the
cases involved. But every time one reads a tirade against John L.
Lewis or some union for striking to bring pressure on the government
to raise wages, there is, of course, a resentment against this action which
interferes with the war effort. But there is also a residue of sentiment
hardly articulate because it is patriotically taboo, that a union is effective
in getting a raise.
That the example of organized labor is not without its effect on the
minds of the unorganized is indicated by the fact that organization is
permeating the middle class and aristocracy of industrial and white
collar workers and the professions. Although a majority of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board had reversed its policy in 1943 and denied
protection of the Wagner Act to supervisory employees except in cer-
tain industries such as printing and maritime, 9 the organization of
foremen has not abated. The result of this reversal of policy has been
frequent strikes which have interfered with the war effort, but the river
of foremen's organization refused to stay away from the door. So
much so that the NLRB is soon to reverse its policy and recognize the
inevitable.' 0 Even the engineering fraternity, which traditionally is as
far removed from unionism as the American Medical Association is
from socialized medicine, is changing its antipathies in regard to union-
ism. Engineering associations all over the country are reorganizing to
act as collective bargaining agencies."' Organization is the spirit of
our times.
There is no reason to believe that in the postwar period organized
labor will cease to exert its pressure, direct or indirect, on the conscious-
ness of the unorganized. Of course the energies and aspirations of
labor leadership are an exceedingly important factor. Thus the ten-
dency of labor leaders is in time to lose the drive and push characteristic
of their youth, particularly when there are enough honors and emolu-
ments to go around. This, of course, is a trait not peculiar to labor
' His statement on Nov. 25, 1944, when the Steel decisions were issued, Car-
negie-Illinois Steel Corp. et al., WLB Case No. 111-6230-D.9 7 re Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N. L. -R. B. 733 (1943); In re Soss Mfg.
Co., 56 N. L. R. B. No. 70 (1944).10 As this is being written the Board is reconsidering its policy in the Packard
Motor Car Co. case heard in Detroit.
" See in this connection the appendices of McIver, Wagner and McGirr's
"Technologists' Stake in the Wagner Act" published in 1944 by the American
Association of Engineers.
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leaders. Businessmen and government officials are not immune from
the germ.
" But there is a factor in labor which would tend to counteract the
lethargies of union organizers. Labor's house divided against itself is
adding wings. The rivalry of the AF of L and the CIO for supremacy
serves as an impetus to organizing campaigns on both sides. The con-
test for jurisdiction is a fillip to stake out and to work claims. Im-
perialism is a power phenomenon and therefore has its counterpart in
labor's competitive milieu. If labor is to heal its breach, it will have
to find the moral equivalent of labor's war. The need to organize
the unorganized in order to avoid their undermining the standards of
the unionized will continue to operate as a stimulant to organizing
drives.
Given a continuation of a democratic postwar America, a not too
hazardous assumption which underlies this analysis throughout, the
socio-economic forces point to a long range increase in labor's organiza-
tional strength.
What are the implications and consequences of this strength in re-
gard to government regulation of our economy?
III
Labor's cumulative power will have a decisive influence on labor's
exercise of its right to strike in the postwar period.
Despite newspaper headlines, labor's strike record during the war
has been remarkably good, much better in fact than what it was in the
last war, and compares favorably with that in England even though
American labor has not worked under the psychological imperatives
operating in the midst of a war theatre.1 2 But strikes are on the in-
crease.13 Labor is restless and the restiveness wells from the rank and
file and communicates itself to the leaders. Though the AF of L and
CIO annual conventions in 1944 renewed the no-strike pledge, it is to
be expected that strikes, particularly of the wildcat variety, should con-
tinue to be on the increase. The accumulating tensions and resentments
of steady and continuous working long overtime hours takes its toll in
explosive quickies. More important, the drive of the rank and file for
higher wages is transmitted into work stoppages, directed equally against
employers, union leaders, and the government officials, as a means of
blowing off wage ceilings. If the immediate postwar period will give
free reign to inflationary forces, it will be characterized by strikes of
epidemic proportions as soon as, or perhaps even before, wartime strike
" Man days lost because of strikes' during the war hover on the average
around one-tenth of one percent of available working time: Strikes in 1943, B. L. S.
BULLETIN No. 782, p. 2.
"Strikes in September, 1944 (1944) 59 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 1017.
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inhibitions re lifted. The experience of 1919 will be recapitulated. 14
Such a strike situation may well result in permanent legislation curbing
labor's right to strike.
But entirely independent of anti-strike legislation and unconditioned
by strike figures in the immediate postwar period, the strike is be-
coming obsolescent as labor's economic weapon even in time of peace.
Labor's power operating against the background of modern technology
is responsible for this. The validity of this paradox is in no measure
diminished because it is surprising. The reasons are endemic in labor's
strength.
It is now recognized that the general strike is no longer to be found
in labor's arsenal. It is not a weapon calculated to achieve economic
results and directed against the employer class. Even if its avowed
purposes are economic and the objectives limited to the usual trade
union variety and though it addresses its conscious pressure against
employer groups, the general strike is a political and indeed a revolu-
tionary weapon aimed in fact if not in intent against the government.
The reason lies in the very impact of the general strike upon society-
and that impact is paralyzing. The effective general strike stops the
services and functions necessary for the maintenance of the life of the
community whether this is on a local or a national scale. This is par-
ticularly true of modern urban society whose life is so dependent on a
continuous maintenance of services. Since the elementary and primary
function of government is to sustain and protect the life of the com-
munity or state, no government can expect to remain in power unless
it causes the immediate discontinuance of the general strike. It can en-
compass this purpose by granting the demands of the strikers, by ef-
fecting a compromise on the issues involved, or by refusing all demands
and breaking the strike. But whatever methQd the government uses it
cannot, whatever its sympathies in regard to the contestants may be,
sit idly by and twiddle its collective thumbs, thus permitting the strike
to run its course. It must intervene promptly and effectively to stop
the strike. The life of the community must go on. This is the reason
why general strikes have traditionally been avowedly of a political or
revolutionary character. And even where this has not been the case,
it was treated as such, as in the general strike in England in 1926, which
was unsuccessful and resulted in anti-labor legislation in 1927.15
The general strike is not an economic weapon which can be used by
labor to attain economic ends without government intervention because
of the colossal effect of the weapon on the community. The conclusion
is warranted then that whenever any other type of strike will approxi-
"The greatest incidence of strikes in the history of the country occurred in
that year: Strikes in 1943, B. L. S. BuLmTIN No. 782, p. 2.
"Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act of 1927, 17 and 18 Geo. V, c. 22.
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mate in effect the proportions of a general strike, it too will in time
cease to be wielded by labor, for it too will bring about government
action for its discontinuance and ultimately prevention.
And because of the organization of modern industry and the growth
of labor organization, strategic industrial and communication strikes
will tend to approximate the effect of general strikes on the community.
Corporate organization of industry in large units increases the range
of the employer's voice in the determination of labor policy. Employer
associations along industrial and inter-industry lines further accentuate
the trend toward uniformity and extensiveness of employer influence.
A similar development is paralleled in the labor movement. The
radius of the union's reach in the making of labor policy is lengthening
with the unionization of the workers. The industrial form of labor
organization as contrasted with the craft type is a contributing factor
of development in the same direction. Industry-wide collective bar-
gaining, such as is found in coal and the needle trades, is the ultimate
development thus far in the direction of extending the direct effect
of employer-union decision. But even without the formalization of
industry-wide bargaining a substantially similar result is obtained, due
to the already indicated large scale employer organization characteristic
of our basic industries and the industrial form of labor organization.
The association of labor unions into large federations such as the AF
of L and CIO further enhances the impact of a decision in labor rela-
tions by increasing the incidence of sympathetic strikes, a phenomenon
which has already given rise to the contagion doctrine of strikes as a
basis of WLB jurisdiction.
The factors of employer and labor organization on industry-wide
basis tend to prolong any deadlock which may result in a strike. The
effectiveness of any strike threat against a single employer resides in his
fear that he might lose his trade to his competitors turing the threatened
strike. But when a strike envelops a whole industry, the fear of com-
petition is removed from the brow of employer negotiators. Likewise,
in large scale corporate organization, loss of immediate profits due to
idle plants does not loom as large in consideration as with the small
individual entrepreneur. With the individual employer and the repre-
sentative of the local unions, the mediator may ply the tricks of his
trade with greater success than is the case when industry-wide impasses
develop where the decisions to be made are great in their effect.
An industry-wide strike immediately withdraws the purchasing
power in the communities directly effected, thus increasing the social
and political tensions of the mercantile, professional and farm groups
of the population whose livelihood is dependent on the factory payroll.16
11 See ROSzirARB, THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY (1940) 92-97.
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But the effect of such strikes transcends the immediate communities
involved. Other industries which utilize the products of the industry
affected may have to shut down where the strike is of any substantial
duration. The effects of a coal, steel or railroad strike cannot be in-
sulated. An industry-wide strike in any of the basic production or
communication industries is of national import in its consequences.
Such a strike would equate in catastrophic effect a general strike
in peacetime or an extensive strike in wartime. In an economy, such
as ours is, which places so great a premium on full and continuous em-
ployment, large-scale strikes are not a phenomenon which government
will be able to observe without positive intervention to 'do away with
and render unnecessary.
The future in regard to strikes has already cast its shadow on at
least one of our basic industries-the railroads-and the reference is
not to wartime conditions. With more praise than understanding the
Railway Labor Act17 applicable to the railroad industry is pointed to
as a model for industry generally to avoid strikes by means of media-
tion and voluntary arbitration. Particularly endearing has become the
so-called "cooling-off" period provided for in the statute during which
no strike or lockout may occur while the healing poultices are being
applied to the collective bargaining process.
The pronouncements of some persons who have had close contact
with the railroad situation, betray very little insight into the realities
of collective bargaining on the railroads.
For one, the "cooling-off" period has really proved to be under the
War Labor Disputes Act which provides for it in regard to war con-
tractors,' 8 a "heating-up" period. Even where no strike is intended
the machinery provided for has been utilized to demonstrate that a
strike is in preparation. Of course this is resorted to frequently as a
ceremonial ritual for the effect it may have on the public, employers
and government officials. But it may well be that the war dance de-
velops psychological drives for release in actual war in the participants
themselves. The history of dictatorships is replete with instances that
propagandists become the victims of their own propaganda. The James-
Lange theory is not without its application in mass movements.
More significant, it may be surprising but even in peacetime there
has not been any independent, private, collective bargaining on the
railroads on the vital issues which can and have caused impasses. The
reason for that is that even in peacetime the government could not
' 44 STAT., pt. 2, 577 (1926) as amended in 1934, 48 STAT. 1185 (1934), 45
U. S. C. A. §§151-164 (1943).
"8 Strikes have been on the increase since the Act was adopted in 1943. There
have also been credible reports that the leaders of the Railroad Unions never in-
tended to go through with the railroad strike by the end of 1943 though all the
preparations were made for that eventuality.
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tolerate the exercise of the right to strike on a large scale on the rail-
roads whose continuous operation is so vital to the nation. Conse-
quently, great railroad strikes have been averted not because of the
surplus of good will and restraint peculiar to the parties in the railroad
industry which caused agreements to be concluded by collective bar-
gaining. Great strikes have failed to occur not because the "cooling-
off" period afforded opportunity to wiser heads to work the miracles
of voluntarism and that blessed word mediation. Great strikes have
been prevented' 9 because on the vital issues on which the parties would
really be expected to lock horns, ad hoc Emergency Boards have been
appointed by the government which decided them for the parties. That
the awards of these boards are only recommendations in form which
the parties are free to ignore after a "cooling-off" interval does not in
any way alter their actual mandatory character backed by the power
of the government. The parties have understood that and have acted
accordingly. There have been no great railroad strikes since this
system has been established. But this has not been due to voluntarism
of private collective bargaining but in the clinches to compulsory gov-
ernment arbitration of the vital contractual terms.
What has been said is not an argument to outlaw strikes. This has
been proven rather futile, particularly as a means of avoiding the
explosive wildcat variety.2 0 The analysis, however, points strongly in
the direction of increasing intervention by the government in peace-
time also to decide the terms of the labor contract as a means of avoid-
ing strikes in the organized basic industries. It is not unlikely that the
strike weapon which was suitable as a labor counterpoise in a small
scale capitalistic economy is becoming obsolescent in a modern economy
in which institutional continuity of operation is of the essence. In the
fullness of time it may take its place with the barricades among other
memorabilia of the capitalistic class struggle. Of course it will con-
tinue to receive the kudos of the pious as among the sacred inalienable
rights, but it will have as much relevance to the actualities of the situa-
tion as the eighteenth century formulated right of revolution which is
found in our politico-legal heritage.
It is elementary that if the government is impelled to avoid strikes
it must intervene to determine at least the vital issues, such as wages,
of the employer-employee relationship. In its ultimate essentials col-
lective bargaining is a contest between the economic power of labor and
that of management. Labor's economic weapon is the strike: that of
the employer is to refuse to accede to the union's demands, to replace
economic strikers, and the lockout. Even where the strike is not re-
See annual reports of the National.Mediation Board. -20The experience in this country has been paralleled by that in Great Britain.
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sorted to, the possibility of such an occurrence is the unexorcisable
spirit of the conference room. The ultimate agreement is an estimate
by both sides of the conference table of what the result would be if an
actual trial of strength took place.
When labor is without its right to strike genuine private collective
bargaining is no longer possible, for the agreement is then a product
of .unilateral voluntary decision-that of the employer. Unless labor
then is to become completely impotent vis a vis the employer decision
must be left to a third party. That is why even in peacetime whenever
labor consents to a no-strike provision in a contract, the logic of the
situation calls for the appointment of an impartial arbitrator to admin-
ister the contract and decide disputes arising during the contract. That
is why when labor gave its no-strike pledge for the duration the govern-
ment, through the National War Labor Board, has bad to decide in
dispute cases not only wages but other issues of the collective agreement
such as union security. Whenever NWLB has refused to rule on cer-
tain so-called "fringe" issues in dispute cases and sent them back to
the parties for collective bargaining, it in essence left them to be decided
unilaterally by the employer uninfluenced by labor's exercise of eco-
nomic pressure.2 ' Hence, NWLB is being forced to rule on more and
more issues 22 of the collective agreement despite recurrent pleas of its
members that labor and management learn to settle their own differ-
ences without invoking government intervention. As long as labor is
without the right to strike, such pleas are futile however well intentioned
they may be.
Of course some quarters might be in favor of depriving labor of
its right to strike and leave the employer the complete freedom to de-
termine the terms of the contract, but obviously no government with
any pretense to democratic principles could afford to do that. More
significant, not even under fascism, where labor has no right to strike,
have employers been left with a free hand in the employer-employee
relationship. The reason lies in the nature of our economy which calls
for coordination. Employers should bear in mind that to the extent
that labor loses its power to strike will government intervention to de-
termine the terms and conditions of employment become imperative.
IV
Government compulsory arbitration to decide issues between em-
ployers and unions is indicated not solely or even primarily by the ne-
cessity of avoiding crippling strikes. That objective aside, increasing
1 For instance, insurance, hospitalization, health: Continental Can Co., WLB
Case No. 2860-D (732), June, 1943; sick leave benefits, Van Norman Machine
Tool Co., WLB Case No. 111-3956-D, Feb. 18, 1944.
22 For instance, severance pay, Carnegie-Illinois. Steel Corp. et al., WLB Case
No. 111-6230-D, Nov. 25, 1944.
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government regulation of the employer-employee relationship even in
regard to the terms and conditions of employment will be brought about
by the need to resolve conflicting social interests and to maintain eco-
nomic equilibrium.
To the evolution of this need as to the imperative of preventing
strikes the growth and structure of organized labor as well as the large
scale organization of employers are prime contributors.
It is elementary that wages in any industry do have a relationship
to the price structure of that industry. Wages are frequently the chief
factor affecting costs, but in any case they are among the most im-
portant components of production costs. Thus, a wage award of the
National War Labor Board becomes effective when the Office of Price
Administration decides that no price increase will result, but if price
ceiling revisions become necessary, wage increases are subject to the
approval of the Stabilization Director.2 3 A numerically small labor
movement organized along craft lines does not influence substantially
the costs of the industry where it is only a small part of the total labor
force, however militant the craft union is in behalf of its own members.
Raises in wages obtained by the few craft members can in ordinary
times be absorbed without causing a rise in costs, through a speed up of
production, an increase in the time worked, or through a wage reduction
of the unorganized many. Craft unionism tends therefore to become
exclusive, conservative and opposed to mass organization of labor, par-
ticularly on industrial lines. These characteristics have been associated
with the history of labor's aristocracy in the United States.
When labor becomes numerous and organized along industrial
lines,24 when a union blankets all or even most of the workers in an
industry any upward revision of wages tends to have a constantly more
pronounced and immediate effect on costs. There are few, if any,
unorganized to absorb the wage increases. Neither can profits be de-
pended upon to be adequate for the absorption even if employer oppo-
sition can be overcome. While the few can profit at the expense of the
many, the converse is not true. Prices, too, cannot always be relied
on to absorb the rise in labor costs. A price rise may result in the
reduction of the number of purchases, thus causing reduction of force.
Frequently, moreover, no price rise is possible without affecting ad-
versely the competitive position of the industry. Thus, ordinarily the
price of coal cannot be indefinitely raised without causing more wide-
spread use of oil and other fuels.
22 Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. et al., WLB Case No. 111-6230-D, Nov. 25,
1944.
2" For an extensive analysis of the craft-industrial controversy insofar as it is
reflected in the determination of the appropriate unit under the National Labor
Relations Act see RosainARm, THE NATIONAL Larol POLIcY (1940) 316-385.
1945]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
But even where the organized industry is not limited by the prices
of competitive products, its price level cannot be freely raised without
effecting severe dislocation in the economy and causing social conflicts.
A prime characteristic and dislocating factor in a great and prolonged
depression is not the deflationary nature of the price level, though that
in itself is significant, because it increases the debt burden of society
and thereby improves the position of the creditor class zis a zis the rest
of the population. Even of greater import is that even within the move-
ment of prices there are great variations. While some prices, in monop-
olistic industries such as steel, for instance, remain rigid, others, more
subject to competition as in agriculture, show a more precipitate and
deeper decline.
If labor through mass industrial organization would continuously
succeed in raising labor costs and thereby the price level, is there any
doubt that this would arouse the opposition of the farm population and
of the unorganized urban groups? But even within labor's organized
family conflict will become hydra-headed. A rise in steel prices due to
raises in wages may prevent an increase in wages of other industries in
whose products steel is an important ingredient. The Marxist dichot-
omy of social conflict between the proletariat and the capitalistic classes
is a simplicistic explanation applicable, if at all, to an economy dom-
inated by the small entrepreneur. It is at variance with the realities of
contemporary society where socio-economic conflict is not only hori-
zontal but perpendicular and assumes many forms, such as urban vs.
rural, regional, and inter-industry. In many of these it is not sur-
prising to find, as in the anti-trust cases, that unions and employers
are not only aligned on the same side but are actively cooperating to
achieve their common, if not identical purposes.
In the light of these conflicts is it not reasonable to assume that the
cry for "parity" will become more persistent and widespread and will
emanate from many quarters including groups within labor? Where
labor is unorganized, it is possible to maintain so-called traditional
inter-industry differentials in wages even in the same locality, but not
in the face of spreading labor organization. Despite goverriment re-
luctance, the trend has been during the war in the direction of eliminating
intra- and inter-industry inequalities, particularly in the sub-standard
level. 25 Of course the chief operative forces have been manpower re-
quirements and union pressure, but what may be termed the politico-
moral factor should not be ignored: that in a democracy it is difficult
indefinitely to defend with success the maintenance of particularly
severe mass inequalities, once public opinion is persistently focused upon2 Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. et al, WLB Case No. 111-6230-D, Nov. 25,
1944; Chairman Davis' statement in regard to "tentative" proposals about Textile
cases, WLB Release, B-1892 (Dec. 22, 1944).
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them and social forces are favorable for their elimination. The effect
of still more widespread organization of labor will be to accentuate the
,drive, already advanced during the war, toward the equalization of the
wage structure of industry, at least on the lower and middle levels.
The wage structure of the country will then be determined by the
trial of strength among gigantic combinations of industry and labor in
each industry and as between industries. The situation in regard to
wages will parallel that obtaining in prices in many basic industries
where monopoly is the determining agent. Indeed the effect of wages
so determined will be to reinforce the monopoly influence on price, by
removing competition in labor costs.
An economy so constituted where wages and prices are monopolis-
tically determined could hardly be referred to as a market economy
where prices and wages are fixed in response to "automatic" economic
forces operating through competition. Where the economic units are
so small that no one unit or moderate combination of them is powerful
enough to influence prices or wages, it is perhaps understandable why
the competitive interplay of forces can be called automatic, but to call
decisions reached in a conference room automatic is inexcusable even
though one is blinded by the smoke on the premises.
When the market was effective, it served as the regulator of the
economy; but since it is rapidly losing its effectiveness in the basic in-
dustries, it can no longer perform that function. But integration is
indispensable to the maintenance of any part or function of society;
otherwise chaos ensues. Even if unions and employers in each industry
would be actuated by the best of good will and public spirit as well as
wisdom, they could not avoid the necessity of coordinating their deci-
sions in regard to wages and perhaps prices with those made in other
industries. It is this lack of provision for coordination which is one
of the chief fallacies of anarcho-syndicalism or any other socio-economic
doctrine from the right or left which seeks to avoid government inter-
vention. To argue that management and labor should organize to treat
of the problems of their particular industries under the supervision but
not the domination of government is to indulge in semantic juggling.
Even where there were no disputes between labor and management,
government would have to hold the power of decision both as a means
of protecting the "parity" claims of interests other than the immediate
producing interest, and to coordinate and interrelate the various indus-
trial plans and decisions. Such coordination or planning is rendered
necessary by a program for full employment which accentuates require-
ments for inter-dependence and equilibrium as between various parts of
our economy.
The cry for self-government for industry involves a conceptual
fallacy. Even if society could be prevailed upon to leave capital and
19451
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labor outside the pale of government intervention, their decisions would
not be effective if they depended solely on voluntarism. But if councils
composed of representatives of capital and labor were granted enforce-
ment powers, they would be part of the government, having the proper-
ties of a rose in regard to nomenclature, for government is ultimately
that agency of society which possesses the power of enforcement. Nor
is it feasible to. exclude the political agencies of the government from
the industrial field. When the cries for "parity" are made, they are
addressed to the government.
Since the first function of the state was of a purely police nature,
that state was called a police state. In that sphere was its first in-
tegrative operation performed. Since now the economic life of the
country will have to be integrated even in times of peace, it is the
political agency of the state-the government which will perform that
vital function. It will not be in the police sphere; it will be in the
realm of public administration that the main emphasis will be placed.
Hence we are on the threshold of what should be called the adminis-
trative state.2 6
Labor itself in its most progressive sectors is already indicating an
awareness of the impact of the developments indicated on collective
bargaining. While the leaders of craft unionism can afford to concen-
trate on wages and conditions of employment of their membership, the
leaders of mass industrial unions cannot remain indifferent to any
aspect of industry including price structure, efficiency measures, fi-
nance, production controls and the competitive position of the industry.
The trend in the evolution of collective bargaining is towards an ex-
panding range of subjects considered within the proper sphere of the
negotiators and not as management prerogatives. In severely competi-
tive industries, such as the needle trades and coal, the unions have been
the greatest stabilizing force-even to the extent in coal of obtaining a
governmental agency to regulate in industry. It is no accident that
the CIO is demanding the establishment of industry councils for each
of the basic and mass production industries to be composed of repre-
sentatives of management, unions and government. The function of
these councils will be to plan for the industries during reconversion.
It is also other than fortuitous that the CIO as well as industrial
unionism generally has made greater strides in the direction of political
action than have the craft unions.27 The logic of industrial organization
leads to government participation in industry and labor interest in
politics.
"
8Assertions in this article on marginal problems of the administrative state
which appear to be ex cathedra will be treated at length in the rest of the book
of which this analysis is a portion.
" For an analysis of labor's political activities see Rosenfarb, Labor's Role in
the Election (1944) 8 PuBLic OPINIo QUARTmLY 376.
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V
In the provenance of the administrative s.tate is not to be found
necessarily the mausoleum of the idea of freedom despite the lamenta-
tions of those who assume to equate economic laissez faire with de-
mocracy.28 Democracy need not fear that fascism or communism has
preempted a monopoly on planned economy. Both in the objectives to
be attained and in the methods of achieving them the administrative
state will admit at least of as great a variety of forms as its predeces-
sors. The war has demonstrated that a planned economy is not in-.
compatible with privately-owned and operated industry as well as with
an independent labor movement. The same can and should be true
under the peacetime controls of the administrative state. This wil be
the American form molded in the tradition of our culture.
Even though it is true that the government will have the decisive
voice in determining the vital sectors of the employer-employee rela-
tionship, labor need not fear that without the weapon of the strike it
will lose its character as a free labor movement. It merely means that
collective bargaining in the main will not be autonomous and private,
but will be carried on on the administrative level in a form similar to
the NWLB with tripartite representation of management, labor and
the government. In place of the strike other weapons more suitable
to the new economic and political environment will be forged. 29 It is
true, of course, that labor unions will not be immune to public regula-
tion but that need not be a death sentence, rather a condition of life.
Power demands responsibility if it is not to deteriorate into tyranny.
And organized labor as a human institution is not immune to the cor-
ruptive influence of power. Already the Supreme Court unanimously
held that organized labor having accepted the benefits of federal pro-
tective legislation must not reject the responsibilities flowing there-
from.3 0
. Compare, Friedrich A. Hayek, THE RoAD To SERFDOm, University of Chicago
Press, 1944.
2 In other parts of the book the labor relations policies of the administrative
state will lie set forth in detail.
"0 In one of the most important decisions which in effect reopens the Civil
Rights cases, the Supreme Court ruled that unions and employers may not enter
into arrangements which discriminate against members of the unit, union or non-
union, on the basis of race or any other consideration irrelevant to the employment
relationship. Chief Justice Stone speaking for a unanimous court declared:
"We think that the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the statutory representa-
tive of a craft at least as exacting a duty to protect equally the interests of
the members of the craft as the Constitution imposes upon a legislature to
give equal protection to the interests of those for whom it legislates. Congress
has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers comparable to
those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of
those whom it represents, cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Labor Board, supra, 335, but it
has also imposed on the representative a corresponding duty. We hold that
the language of the Act to which we have referred, read in the light of the
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How soon are we to witness the full emergence of the events here
considered? It is always a most hazardous undertaking to take the
variable pulse of history. As already indicated, the temper of labor,
industry and government is to do away with governmental war regula-
tions of the labor contracts as soon as possible after victory. There
may, of course, be an interlude in which this might succeed, but it will
only be an interlude. A politicist can afford to be ahead of his time.
A statesman is one who keeps abreast of the times. A politician tries
to catch up with the times. A reactionary is one who would bid the
sun turn from west to east. It may be that even during the period of
reconversion it will become evident that government regulations treated
in this analysis are dictated by a condition not a theory. If so, then
those who will hold the power of decision and who act upon similar
convictions will be considered not academicians but statesmen.
purposes of the Act, expresses the aim of Congress to impose on the bargaining
representative of a craft or class of employees the duty to exercise fairly the
power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts, without hos-
tile discrimination against them." Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Co. et al. See 13 U. S. LAw WEsx 4075, 4077 (Dec. 18, 1944). - U. S. -
-Sup. Ct. - , - L. ed. - (1944).
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